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The issue that communications law and policy faces over the next five years
is not whether markets will play a significant role in the regulatory process.
That ship sailed some twenty years ago when Congress authorized the FCC to
award spectrum licenses by auction and later to forebear from common carrier
regulation. Rather, the challenge lies in the extent to which other mandates will
be added to the use of markets as regulatory surrogates.
Randolph May, Founder and President of The Free State Foundation, has assembled a short collection of nine essays from scholars and a Member of Congress who attempt to peer into the future of communications regulation. This
goal is accomplished by stating the case for moving from the public interest
standard of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and replacing it
with greater reliance on markets forces.' Market failures that result in predatory
actions and unfair trade practices would be addressed using traditional antitrust
remedies. The book offers well-stated arguments that both liberty and consumer welfare would be served if the march toward a more market-driven regulatoThe author was one of the founding partners of Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, DC, in
1983; in 2013, he became of counsel to the firm; J.D., University of Virginia; B.B.A., University of Kentucky. His practice primarily involves the FCC's regulation of radio technology. The opinions expressed in this review are the author's and do not necessarily represent
those of his firm or its clients.
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ry paradigm were not compromised by attempts to graft legacy regulatory obligations--derived from traditional common carrier regulation--onto modem
information services. In parallel with this reasoning, one of the essays also addresses "public media" by applauding the institutional diversity that characterizes public broadcasting at the station-level while decrying the focus on broadcasting as the medium deserving of so much current support and attention.
Like any good assessment of what the future should look like, the book also
serves as a brief compendium of how communications regulation arrived at
where it is. Although it makes no pretense of providing a brief in support of
countervailing views, the book offers a helpful set of arguments that even those
who disagree with some of its premises and recommendations may find
thought-provoking.
Why We Need a Free Market Approachfor the Communicationsand HighTech Sectors, Rep. Marsha Blackburn'

To set the stage, the book relies on an article adapted from an address by
Rep. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN).3 She does this succinctly by reciting three
principles:
* First, the government's default position must be "Do No Harm."4
* Second, government needs to respect private markets.5
* Third, we need to streamline government rules and regulations to
better reflect the competitive and dynamic characteristics that define communications and technology markets.6
From this statement of principles, the articles that follow offer supporting
arguments and an occasional theme and variation, such as the foray into the
future of public media. The collection of essays ends with an article by economist Bruce Owen in which he injects a dose of caution, if not reality, into the
other authors' predictions and recommendations.' Indeed, if May's goal had
been to temper enthusiasm for the approach instead of beginning with an articulate call to action, the Owen article would have been very similar to that by
Rep. Blackburn. However, both the cheerleading and the reality check serve
2
Rep. Marsha Blackburn, Why We Need a Free Market Approachfor the Communications and High-Tech Sectors, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE DIGITAL AGE,
supra note 1, at 9. Rep. Blackburn is the Vice-Chair of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee.
3 Id.

4

Id. at 13.

5 Id. at 13-14.
6
Id. at 14.
7 Bruce M. Owen, Communications Policy Reform, Interest Groups, and Legislative
Capture,in COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 1,
at 149.
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salutary purposes and provide context and content in support of the articles in
between.
Placing Communications Law and Policy Under a Constitution ofLiberty,
Randolph J May & Seth L. Cooper8

May and Cooper offer a tutorial on regulatory evolution in the digital age
coupled with the enjoinder to be wary of well-intended regulators. The authors
take their cue from twentieth century Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek and lay
out their theses:
Hayek's minimal requirements for an effective market system in a society respecting
individual freedom yield a set of basic insights for reforming communications law and
policy for the digital age. These basic insights are: (1) a proper function of government is the protection of property and enforcement of contracts; (2) free markets, not
government officials, should dictate the quantities of goods and services produced and
the prices at which they are offered; (3) administrative agencies are very often overzealous in pursuing the public good, at the expense of individual freedom; and (4)
costs imposed by new regulations almost always are underestimated, while new developments are not fully anticipated. 9

From this foundation, they argue that consumer welfare flourishes most
when markets are allowed to function and market failures are addressed
through traditional antitrust remedies.' Digital technology and Internet Protocol ("IP") based networks have brought about an expanding plethora of choices
to replace or improve existing services and opportunities to advance the development of services not yet conceived." Traditional common carrier regulation,
with its prohibitions on discrimination and unreasonable rates, is ill suited to an
IP-era characterized by a wide array of service options, many of which are
substitutable for each other. By the time traditional public interest regulation
addresses a problem, the factual basis for the problem will have evolved to
such an extent that the cure no longer adequately addresses the illness if, indeed, it ever could have done so. Moreover, May and Cooper posit that the
cure will be worse than the malady, for the remedy will bring with it a loss of
freedom that will lead to less innovation, fewer choices, and less overall consumer satisfaction.

8
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note 1, at 17. Mr. May is the Founder and President of The Free State Foundation. Mr.
Cooper is a Research Fellow with The Free State Foundation.
9 Id. at 20.
10 See id. at 21-22.
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InternetPolicy Going Forward.-Does One Size Still FitAll?, ChristopherS.
12

Yoo

Yoo also builds on the philosophical foundation laid by Hayek and calls for
a limited role for government in the regulation of 21st century communications. In doing so, he challenges the common assertion that the Internet has
been-and should be-one network of networks open to all, 3 and goes on to
question the wisdom of the FCC's Open Internet Order.4
In laying out these positions and positing private networking as an "exit option,"' 5 Yoo asserts:
The assumption that the Internet must remain open and universally interconnected
also overlooks the fact that the imposition of government regulation rarely results in a
stable equilibrium. Instead, the ultimate impact of such regulations can only be understood after the series of reactions and counter-reactions that the regulations are likely
to stimulate are taken into account. Indeed, mandates of equal access to traditional telephone networks (along with attempts to use rates for interconnection to implement
other social policies) stimulated demand for private bypass services that unless also
regulated threatened to defeat the goals of the original regulation ....
Thus, those who advocate mandating open access in the name of preserving a unified Internet must consider the possibility that such a mandate might actually create
incentives toward greater fragmentation. In addition, restricting network owners' ability to share surplus capacity threatens to increase the cost of broadband where it is
available, while at the same time worsening the digital divide by reducing the geographic areas in which such service can break even ....
Most relevant for our purposes is the fact that mandating open interconnection implicitly presumes that the exclusive source of value to end users is raw increases in
network size. Framing the issue in this manner fails to consider that end users typically place a premium on being able to reach a small number of locations and run a discrete number of applications. 6

Long-time observers of the evolution of the Internet should hardly be surprised by Yoo's observations that the value of a network does not necessarily
vary proportionately to the number of connections made on the network. However, at first blush, the proposition seems counterintuitive given the twentieth
century's goal of ever expanding the reach of the public switched telephone
network ("PSTN"). With the transition from the PSTN to an IP-based network, 7 Yoo's ideas will assume even more currency.
12 Christopher S. Yoo, Internet Policy Going Forward: Does One Size Fit All?, in
COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE DIGITAL

AGE, supra note 1,
at 51. Christopher S.
Yoo is a Professor of Law and Computer & Information Science at the University of Pennsylvania, and a Professor of Communication at the Annenberg School for Communication.
13 Id. at 52.
14 In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Report and Order,
25 F.C.C.R. 17,905 (Dec. 21, 2010).
15 Yoo, supranote 12, at 63-64.
16 Id. at 63-64.
17 See, e.g., Pleading Cycle Established on AT&T and NTCA Petitions, Public Notice,
27 F.C.C.R. 15,766 (Dec. 14, 2013) (requesting comments on separate rulemaking petitions
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ReconcilingBreadth and Depth in Digital Age CommunicationsPolicy, James
B. Specta'8
According to Specta, the shift to IP-based communications, particularly the
Internet, coupled with the increasing move to mobile as opposed to fixed systems, has set up a situation in which the market and regulation are increasingly
out of step with each other. To the extent that the Internet is treated as an information service, Specta finds it incongruous to mix an unregulated information service with the regulatory clout accorded the agency in the regulation
of mobile services under Title 111. 9 On the other hand, if the FCC wins the appeal of its Open Internet Order," the Commission's then preserved-and arguably enhanced-power under Title I of the Act2' will allow it to proceed with
an approach that fails to take into account the competitive realities of communications in the digital age.
As an alternative, Specta posits a system based on the draft Digital Age
Communications Act22 that would "adopt[] a competition law standard, borrowed from the Federal Trade Commission Act, authorizing the FCC to make
rules and issue orders to prevent 'unfair methods of competition' and 'unfair or
deceptive practices."' 23 Such an approach, he submits, is less likely to become
obsolete, less likely to be gamed by participants, and will still "provide a
measure of certainty and stability for industry participants."24
Restoring a Minimal Regulatory Environmentfor a Healthy Wireless Future,
Seth L. Cooper'
Cooper recounts the path to constraints over the last several years. He begins
filed by AT&T and the National Telecommunications Cooperative Association to respectively "facilitate the 'telephone' industry's continued transition from legacy transmission
platforms and services to new services based fully on the Internet Protocol ('IP')" and "'examine the means of promoting and sustaining the ongoing evolution of the Public Switched
Telephone Network' from TDM to IP").
18 James B. Specta, Reconciling Breadth and Depth in Digital Age Communications
Policy, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 1, at 67.
James B. Specta is a Professor and Associate Dean of International Initiatives and Director
of the Executive LLM Program at Northwestern University School of Law.
19 See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 307-310 (2006).
20
See Joint Brief for Verizon and MetroPCS at 2-4, Verizon v. F.C.C., No. 11-1355
(D.C. Cir. July 2, 2012).
21
See47U.S.C. §§ 251-261, 271-276.
22
Digital Age Communications Act of 2005, S. 2113, 109th Cong. (2005).
23 Specta, supra note 18, at 76.
24

Id. at 75.
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by outlining the steps designed to lessen regulatory burdens in order to spur the
development of new services and markets. Cooper concludes by asserting the
steps that are necessary to manage competition prospectively. His twisting path
recounts:
" Forbearance of Title II regulation on wireless services (1994);26
* Wireless broadband Internet access service declared to be a Title I
information service and therefore free from Title II common carrier
regulation (2007);"

*

Open Access requirements imposed on the 700 MHz C Block
2
(2008); 1

*

Open Internet Order provided for industry-wide regulation of service providers to include transparency and no-blocking requirements (2010); 29
* Data Roaming Order imposed obligations to pass traffic for competitors who had not built facilities (2011);3 and
* The FCC staff's Order in Harbinger/SkyTerra showed a willingness
to restrict competitors (2010), a trend that continued in the agency's
approval of the assignment of certain Qualcomm licenses to AT&T
(2011). '
Cooper finds the move from reliance on markets to one of "markets plus" a
26
See In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act;
Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Second Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 1411 (Feb.
3, 1994).
27 In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Wireless Networks, DeclaratoryRuling, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901 (Mar. 22, 2007).
28 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands; Revision of
the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling
Systems; Section 68.4(a) of the Commission's Rules Governing Hearing Aid-Compatible
Telephones; Biennial Regulatory Review - Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27, and 90 to
Streamline and Harmonize Various Rules Affecting Wireless Radio Services; Former
Nextel Communications, Inc. Upper 700 MHz Guard Band Licenses and Revisions to Part
27 of the Commission's Rules; Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band; Development of Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety Communications
Requirements Through the Year 2010; Declaratory Ruling on Reporting Requirement under
Commission's Part I Anti-Collusion Rule, Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289
(July 31, 2007).
29 In re Preserving the Open Internet Report & Order,supra note 14, at 17,905.
30 In re Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service
Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, Second Report and Order, 26
F.C.C.R. 5411 (Apr. 7, 2011).
31 In re SkyTerra Communications, Inc., Transferor and Harbinger Capital Partners
Funds, Transferee; Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of SkyTerra Subsidiary,
LLC, Memorandum Opinion and Order and DeclaratoryRuling, 25 F.C.C.R. 3059 (Mar.
26, 2010); In re Application of AT&T Inc. and Qualcomm Incorporated For Consent to
Assign Licenses and Authorizations, Order,26 F.C.C.R. 17,589 (Dec. 22, 2011).
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disturbing trend. 2 Absent a change in the Communications Act, he calls upon
the FCC to apply a light regulatory touch while recognizing the dynamism of
wireless services and the critical role of wireless in the digital economy. Such
an approach would reinstate the "firewall" between Title I information services
and more intrusive common carrier style regulation.33 Consistent with the firstdo-no-harm principle espoused earlier, Cooper concludes that:
Under a light-touch regulatory approach, the FCC should not pull policy levers because the agency believes its polices can improve market performance. Regulation
should be limited to those instances where there is a demonstrable market failure or
anti-competitive harm to consumers, where the benefits of establishing clear and narrowly targeted regulation outweigh the costs, and where no less intrusive means are
available.34

Thus, Cooper urges that, short of a rewrite of the Communications Act, if
the Commission were to use its forbearance authority extensively to accord
relief, it would incentivize service providers to make available competing
cross-platform offerings.
ProposedFCCIncentive Spectrum Auctions: The Importance ofRe-Optimizing
Spectrum Use, Michelle P. Connolly"
Continuing with the compilation's theme of first-do-no-harm, respect markets, and streamline regulations to reflect the dynamic nature of wireless information services, Connolly offers advice about the very complex exercise
contemplated in the incentive auction initiative now being planned by the FCC
to make available additional spectrum for wireless services using portions of
the spectrum currently allocated for and assigned to UHF television broadcasting.36 In so doing, she warns:
[A]ny attempt to impose limits on payments to winning TV broadcaster bidders or set
minimums for government revenue from the auction would break the auction mechanism.
The auction mechanism works to make the TV broadcasters bid based on their
willingness to undertake certain actions, and in turn, to make those wishing to purchase the right to use the released spectrum bid based on the economic value of the
spectrum to them. If the government imposes financial limits, or ownership limits on
the auction, it breaks this mechanism. If the mechanism is interfered with sufficiently,

33
34

See Cooper, supra note 25, at 103.
Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 105-06.
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Michelle P. Connolly, ProposedFCC Incentive Spectrum Auctions: The Importance
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of Re-Optimizing Spectrum Use, in COMMUNICATIONs LAW AND POLICY IN THE DIGITAL
AGE, supra note 1, at 107. Michelle P. Connolly is Professor of the Practice within the Duke
University Economics Department, and the former Chief Economist of the FCC.
36 See In re Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum
Through Incentive Auctions, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 27 F.C.C.R. 12,357 (Sept. 28,
2012).

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 21

the auction will not only yield smaller revenues, but it will guarantee that spectrum
will be allocated in an inferior manner.37

In short, Connolly's advice is very much in keeping with the theme that
markets should be allowed to operate and that markets plus regulatory restrictions intended to implement other policies should be avoided.
Reforming the UniversalService Fundfor the DigitalAge, DanielA. Lyons'8

The United States has long wrestled with how to expand the benefits of
modem technology to under-served areas that are costly to serve. In the nineteenth century, the same concern resulted in the creation of incentives for canals and railroads. The twentieth century saw ambitious programs for rural
electrification, interstate highways, and subsidized telephone service. After the
breakup of the Bell System, telephone subsidies emerged from the shadows of
complex ratemaking into the only slightly more illuminated world of the Universal Service Fund ("USF").
Lyons lays out the case for the reform of USF. While carrier beneficiaries of
USF regulation are understandably concerned about lost revenue associated
with recent revisions to the USF program,39 Lyons argues for more change. He
notes how the USF program can encourage what he classifies as inefficiencies
and support for outmoded technology, and he further calls for changes that he
submits would advance the movement to widespread competitive digital networks.4" In so doing, he encourages the development of a program that avoids
paying subsidies when subsidies are unnecessary and would eschew calculations based on embedded costs in favor of reverse auctions to promote the development of broadband networks. 4 He also champions direct subsidies to
consumers in targeted underserved areas who would then choose their broadband providers. 2 To these ends, he argues that:
America's migration to broadband networks presents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to bring transformational change to an outdated, mismanaged, and schizophrenic assistance program. Policymakers should capitalize on this brief window of
Connolly, supra note 35, at 121.
Daniel A. Lyons, Reforming the Universal Service Fund for the Digital Age, in
COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 1, at 123. Daniel A.
Lyons is an Assistant Professor at Boston College Law School.
39 See, e.g., In re Connect America Fund; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future;
Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers; High-Cost Universal
Service Support; Developing an Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime; Federal-State
Joint Board on Universal Service; Lifeline and Link-Up; Universal Service Reform - Mobility Fund, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 F.C.C.R.
17,663 (Oct. 27, 2011).
40 See Lyons, supra note 38, at 129-30.
41 Id. at 131-34.
42 Id. at 131-32.
37
38
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opportunity by adopting market-based initiatives whose goal is to assist those who
cannot afford basic broadband Internet access. And it should provide that assistance
directly to affected consumers, rather than supporting carriers as their proxies in ways
that distort broadband competition....
Similarly, the Commission should commit to slowly but firmly phasing out the
High-Cost Fund assistance given directly to carriers, by steadily decreasing the
amount of annual subsidies available until the program is eliminated....
Finally, Congress should abandon the fund's increasingly arcane contribution
methodology. The existing contribution system relies on anachronistic distinctions between interstate and intrastate service and between telecommunications and information services, which are largely irrelevant in the broadband age. 3

Accordingly, for Lyons, the transition to IP networks offers the opportunity
to move from what he sees as a flawed system of subsidies to a program that
would better serve areas and people in need of assistance.

Public Media Policy Reform and DigitalAge Realities, Ellen P. Goodman"'

Far from giving up on public media, Goodman celebrates the diversity offered in the mix of broadcast station licensees associated with what has long
been called "public broadcasting."45 At the same time, she asserts that the time

has come for moving away from broadcasting as the primary focus for public
support of public media. Seeking to maximize innovation, she envisions a decentralized approach that would begin with:
[A] delineation of public media functions that track the architecture of digital networks and the goal of innovation, and (2) an overhaul of the Public Broadcasting Act
of 1967 to support this functional approach, liberating the support of public media
(broadcasting) and institutional structure (existfrom a particular distribution platform
6
ing public broadcast entities).

Although the editor's choice of including such an essay may seem like a diversion, it is, in fact, in keeping with the book's emphasis on reforms needed in
both law and policy in the digital age. Indeed, one could argue that such reforms are required if public media are to survive in times of both rapid technological change and fiscal constraint.

Id. at 130, 133-34.
Ellen P. Goodman, Public Media Policy Reform and DigitalAge Realities, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 1,at 137. Ellen P. Goodman
is a Professor at the Rutgers School of Law - Camden.
45 See id.
at 137 n.1.
46 Id. at 139 (footnote omitted).
43
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Communications Policy Reform, Interest Groups, and Legislative Capture,
Bruce M Owen 7
While his fellow contributors explain what should happen in communications law and policy, Owen notes what has happened and why change may not
unfold either quickly or along the lines that others suggest would be beneficial.
In short, he attempts to inject a note of reality into the discussion. He recognizes the grip that the FCC holds on spectrum allocations,48 the problems associated with the current system of subsidies under the USF,49 the efforts that have
been laid to facilitate expanded regulation of media content," "and the consequences of widespread acceptance among the public of the notion that every
conceivable fear of market failure in the communications industry can and
should be treated prophylactically by aggressive federal legislation and regulation."'" However, Owen offers little salute for the proposition that regulatory
agencies such as the FCC are directly captured by special interests. Instead, he
would have readers look to Capitol Hill. 2 According to Owen:
It is rather legislative oversight and budget committees and their chairs that are
(willingly) captured by special interests in the first instance. One could equally say
that legislators capture the special interests, seeking campaign funding. The behavior
53
of regulatory agencies simply reflects the preferences of their congressional masters.
Owen further asserts that:
Any significant changes in policy will require corresponding changes in the constellation of groups whose interests the Commission and the congressional committees
serve, or changes in technology that must be embraced within the pre-existing balance
of power reflected in policy....
The FCC, Congress, and administrations of both parties continue to design new interventions in the communications industries. The likely effect of such interventions
will be to render industry structure less responsive to competitive forces and to attenuate technical innovation. 4
Any look into the future must be made using an imperfect lens. However,
Randolph May has assembled a worthy summary of arguments from the perspective of those who believe passionately in the value of liberty and the power
of markets to direct the evolution of communications services in the digital
47 Bruce M. Owen, Communications Policy Reform, Interest Groups, and Legislative
Capture, in COMMUNICATIONs LAW AND POLICY INTHE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 1, at 149.
Bruce Owen is the Gordon Cain Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy
Research and a Professor in Public Policy and Director of the Stanford Public Policy Program.
48 Id. at 161-64.
49 Id. at 164-66.
50 Id. at 166-68.
51 Id. at 151; see id. at 170-72.
52 Id. at 159.
53 Id. at 149-50.
54 Id.at 160.
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age. As Moore's Law continues to yield more opportunities for the development of IP-based devices and services, the case for reliance on markets to govern the choices and distribution of new services will likely grow even stronger.

55

55 See Michael Kanellos, Moore's Law to Roll on for Another Decade, CNET.CoM (Feb.
10, 2003 2:27 PM PST), http://commcns.org/15t6SvY (explaining that Moore's Law,
"which states that the number of transistors on a given chip can be doubled every two
years," is expected to continue for at least another decade).

